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GETTING BACK TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: WARRANTLESS CELL PHONE SEARCHES

What we do know is that the Framers were men who focused on the
wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth Amendment to safeguard
fundamental values which would far outlast the specific abuses which
gave it birth.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Cell phones today boast features from Internet access and e-mail to live video
streaming from cell phone to cell phone.2 Cell phones have even replaced trips to the
bank, allowing cellular users to deposit checks electronically simply by scanning the
check with the phone’s built-in camera.3 Few would dispute that cell phones today
have the capacity to store incredible amounts of personal information, and often do.4
Thus, warrantless searches of cell phones present unique privacy concerns not
associated with other personal effects that may be lawfully searched under exceptions
to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.5 While
the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address the specific issue, lower courts have split
on whether exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, developed years before the cell
phone was invented, apply to warrantless searches of cell phones.6
1.

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).

2.

See HTC Evo™ 4G at Sprint, HTC, http://www.htc.com/us/products/evo-sprint/ (last visited Jan. 29,
2012); iPhone Facetime, Apple, http://www.apple.com/iphone/features/facetime.html (last visited Jan.
29, 2012).

3.

Sandra Block, No Bank? No Problem. Phone Apps Let You Deposit Checks, USA Today (July 14, 2010, 5:51
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/2010-07-13-mobile-deposit_N.htm.

4.

See United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40596, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 23,
2007).

5.

See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (“Although cell phones cannot be equated with
laptop computers, their ability to store large amounts of private data gives their users a reasonable and
justifiable expectation of a higher level of privacy in the information they contain.”).

6.

Compare United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009) (upholding warrantless cell phone
search as lawful under the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant
Clause), United States v. Salgado, No. 1:09-CR-454-CAP-ECS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77266 (N.D.
Ga. June 15, 2010) (upholding warrantless searches of a cell phone under the exigent circumstances
exceptions to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment), United States v. Meador, No. 1:06 CR
134 CDP DDN, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92728 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 7, 2008) (upholding warrantless cell
phone search as lawful under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause),
United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111623 (N.D.
Ga. Jan. 22, 2008) (upholding warrantless cell phone search as lawful under the search incident to arrest
exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause), United States v. Zamora, No. 1:05-CR-250WSD, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40775 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2005) (upholding warrantless cell phone
search as lawful under the search incident to arrest and exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth
Amendment Warrant Clause), and United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (D. Kan. 2003), aff ’d
in part, remanded in part sub nom. United States v. McNeill, 136 F. App’x 153 (10th Cir. 2005) (upholding
warrantless cell phone search as lawful under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth
Amendment Warrant Clause), with Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (refusing to uphold a warrantless search of a
cell phones under any of the exceptions to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment because cell
phones are not closed containers as they cannot hold physical objects within them and warrantless
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This note argues that current warrantless cell phone search jurisprudence has
become far removed from the liberties that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment
sought to protect, namely freedom from warrantless searches.7 The drafters sought to
protect individuals from warrantless searches because “the Framers had the struggle
for liberty and history of abuse fresh in the[ir] memories when they adopted the
Fourth Amendment and intended to prevent these types of abuses from reoccurring.”8
Today, cell phones, especially smartphones, are among the most private effects a
person owns, storing significant amounts of detailed personal information that would
not otherwise be easily accessible to an officer executing a search of an individual.
When the drafters convened to author the Fourth Amendment, however, they
undoubtedly had not envisioned the invention of cellular telephones, yet they could
not have intended that individuals would be denied the protection of the Fourth
Amendment with respect to searches of such personal effects, capable of storing an
incredible wealth of information about an individual. Still, virtually every court that
has faced the issue has upheld as constitutional a warrantless cell phone search.9 This
is problematic because often implicit in upholding a warrantless cell phone search is
a court’s determination that a cell phone is a closed container akin to an address book
or pager. However, cell phones are exceedingly more complex than these items which
merely contain phone numbers. Cell phones have the capacity to store a wealth of
private information such as bank account information, recently visited locations,
photographs, and Internet browsing history—to name a select few. As a result, the
reality of warrantless cell phone searches today is that individuals are denied Fourth
Amendment protection from searches of their cell phones by certain exceptions
searches of cell phones raise serious privacy concerns that outweigh the rationales of the exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause), and Park, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40596 (refusing to uphold
a warrantless search of a cell phone under any of the exceptions to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment based on a finding that cell phones are not closed containers as they cannot hold physical
objects within them and warrantless searches of cell phones raise serious privacy concerns that outweigh
the rationales of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause).
7.

“The Fourth Amendment was drafted amidst concerns ‘almost exclusively about the need to ban house
searches under general warrants.’ The idea of a warrantless search was foreign to the Framers; indeed,
they ‘expected that warrants would be used.’” Rachael A. Lynch, Note, Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Fourth
Amendment Right: Samson Court Errs in Choosing Proper Analytical Framework, Errs in Result, Parolees
Lose Fourth Amendment Protection 11, 41 Akron L. Rev. 651, 693 n.14 (2008) (citation omitted) (quoting
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 552 (1999)).

8.

Id. at 654 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

9.

See, e.g., Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (upholding warrantless cell phone search as lawful under the search
incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause); Salgado, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77266 (upholding warrantless searches of a cell phone under the exigent circumstances exception
to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment); Suarez-Blanca, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111623
(upholding warrantless cell phone search as lawful under the search incident to arrest exception to the
Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause); Meador, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92728 (upholding warrantless
cell phone search as lawful under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause);
Zamora, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40775 (upholding warrantless cell phone search as lawful under the
search incident to arrest and exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant
Clause); Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (upholding warrantless cell phone search as lawful under the
exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause).
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carved out of the Fourth Amendment, specifically, the search incident to arrest,
automobile, and exigent circumstances exceptions.
This note also proposes an analytical framework—rooted in two of the only cases
to suppress warrantless searches of a cell phone—that courts should use in applying
the Fourth Amendment to warrantless cell phone searches. The framework begins
with the presumption that the particular warrantless cell phone search was unlawful.
This presumption may only be overcome through testimony of the officer who
searched the cell phone without a warrant. The officer’s testimony must contain
specific and articulable facts, known to the officer at the time of the search,
demonstrating that the specific cell phone was at risk of remote deletion of potential
evidence. Additionally, the officer must further testify that there were no preventative
measures available to him at the time of the search which could secure any evidence
potentially stored on the cell phone. This framework will adhere to the principles of
the Fourth Amendment by protecting the significant privacy concerns unique to
modern-day cell phones—concerns that will only increase as society progresses
toward further technological advances.
Part II.A of this note describes the invention and development of the cellular
telephone and details the vast amount of private information that can be stored on a
cell phone. Part II.B examines the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and lays the foundation for understanding how courts currently analyze warrantless
searches of cell phones. Part III of this note begins by describing the precursors to
warrantless cell phone search jurisprudence, namely, how courts evaluated warrantless
searches of pagers. Part III then synthesizes current warrantless cell phone search
case law. Part IV of this note argues that current warrantless cell phone jurisprudence
has strayed far from the principles that motivated the drafting of the Fourth
Amendment, a protection of individuals against the great power of the federal
government through strict adherence to the Warrant Clause.10 Part IV also describes
the model through which courts may reestablish Fourth Amendment protection in
this arena in accordance with the Framers’ intent. This framework requires that law
enforcement obtain a warrant prior to the execution of any search of a cell phone.
However, this framework includes a very limited exception providing for lawful
warrantless searches of cell phones where an officer can specifically articulate exigent
circumstances at the time of the search, i.e., the officer had facts before him
establishing that the particular phone to be searched would delete, or be subject to
remote deletion of, evidence. Part V of the note concludes by reiterating the incredible
amounts of private information present-day cell phones are capable of storing.
Through the adoption of the proposed framework, the protection of personal effects
that the Framers sought to ensure will be revived and courts will begin on the long
journey back to the Fourth Amendment.

10.

See Lynch, supra note 7, at 654.
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II. THE HISTORY OF CELL PHONES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXCEPTIONS TO
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

A. The Invention and Development of Cell Phones
The first cellular telephone was developed by Dr. Martin Cooper, of the Motorola
Company, in April 1973.11 Dubbed the Motorola Dyna-Tac, it weighed approximately
two and a half pounds and was over nine inches long.12 Dyna-Tac’s capability
permitted the user only to place a phone call with the ability to speak and listen to
the recipient; the user could not receive incoming calls.13 Over thirty-seven years
later, even the most basic cell phones have the ability to place and receive phone
calls—and much more.14 Exponential advances in cell phone technology and
capability in the intervening decades have produced cell phones that bear very little
resemblance to the Dyna-Tac.15
Cell phones now hold vast amounts of detailed personal information.16 Today,
even the most basic cell phones have the capacity to store significant amounts of
personal and private information, including telephone numbers, photos, and the
dates and times of incoming and outgoing messages.17 For example, cell phones not
only keep a log of the telephone numbers, dates, and times associated with incoming,
outgoing, and missed phone calls, but also include a log of stored telephone numbers
in an address book.18 In addition, virtually all modern cell phones have the capacity
to send and receive text messages.19 Most cell phones today also come equipped with
11.

Richard Worth, Great Inventions: Telephone and Telegraph 40–41 (2006).

12.

Id.

13.

National Geographic Society, 1000 Events That Shaped the World: History Series 936
(2008).

14.

The Dyna-Tac could only place, not receive, calls. See Worth, supra note 11.

15.

“Cell phone,” “mobile phone,” and “phone” will be used interchangeably throughout the note as their
definitions are synonymous. The creation and capabilities of smartphones will also be explored later in
this note. Smartphones, as will be defined, are a special category within the broader umbrella of cell
phones, mobile phones, and phones. These phones possess certain technological capabilities that other
basic cell phones do not.

16.

See Gijs Van Oenen, A Logistic Perspective on Crime, in New Directions for Criminology 90 (Ronny
Lippens & Patrick Van Calster eds., 2010).
[The cell phone] has an increasing amount of personal data stored in its memory banks. . . .
[O]ur ‘handy’ is merely one small (SIM-)chip in an enormous wireless computer system. . . .
For instance, railway companies use data from cell phone providers to compile precise
estimates of how many people travel at a certain stretch at a given time. Because cell
phones every few minutes emit signals to let the network know where they are, it is easy
to establish how many cell phones there are on a train . . . .
Id. at 90.

17.

Michele L. Berry, State of Ohio v. Smith: Cell Phones Do Not Equal “Closed Containers” for Purposes of
Warrantless Search Incident Arrest, 2010 Emerging Issues 4788.

18.

See, e.g., State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954–55 (Ohio 2009).

19.

See, e.g., United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR-ZLOCH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103058, at *11
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008).
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built-in cameras that allow users to take photographs and videos and store them to
the phone’s memory. 20 Combining the camera and text-message features, most
phones can send photos stored on the cell phone to other cell phones using a picture
message. Even those phones without the capacity to take photographs usually allow
the user to receive picture messages from other cell phone users, and have the capacity
to store the photo to the phone’s memory as well as the date and time the photo was
received. The foregoing capabilities demonstrate that even the most basic cell
phones21 store a significant amount of personal information raising serious privacy
concerns in the context of warrantless searches.22
In this new era of rapidly advancing technology, most present-day cell phones are
significantly more advanced and provide substantially more storage capacity than
basic cell phones.23 The most prominent feature of these phones, often referred to as
“smartphones,” is access to the Internet, 24 which opens the door to a seemingly
endless number of capabilities and, in turn, a seemingly endless amount of personal
information that can be stored on the cell phone. 25 The browser function tracks
Internet browsing history and stores a log of websites visited, including the dates on
which those websites were accessed.26 In addition, Internet access provides users with
the ability to receive and send e-mails, which are all stored to the phone along with
the date and time the message was received or sent.27 Internet access also provides for
the download of such confidential information as corporate documents and VPN
20. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Aleman, No. 1:10-CR-29, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65333, at *10 (E.D.

Tex. June 9, 2010) (photographs); United States v. Roberts, 319 F. App’x 575, 577 (9th Cir. 2009)
(videos).
21.

It should be noted that these basic cell phones often have a limited storage capacity, forcing the phone to
automatically delete the oldest archived entries to make room for incoming calls, texts, or photos or
withhold incoming entries until older entries are manually deleted by the user. See United States v.
Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1304 (D. Kan. 2003), aff ’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. United
States v. McNeill, 136 F. App’x 153 (10th Cir. 2005). Although this seems to present an argument in
favor of warrantless cell phones searches, because of the apparent risk of destruction of evidence, as later
discussed in Part V, by simply powering the cell phone off law enforcement officers can preserve the
information currently retained on the phone as well as information awaiting to be received by the phone.

22.

See Norbert Pachler et al., Mobile Learning: Structures, Agency, Practices 88 (2010).
The risk to privacy that mobile/cell phones may bring is an area of growing concern for
some citizens. A device that is carried by the individual, and that contains much
information that is highly personalised, carries an inherent ability to compromise our
privacy if it falls into the hands of others . . . .
Id.

23.

See Patsy J. Fulton-Calkins et al., The Administrative Professional: Technology and
Procedures 152 (14th ed. 2010).

24.

Id.

25.

See Mohammad Ilyas & Syed Ahson, Smartphones: Research Report 3 ( 2006).

26. Id. at 45–46.
27.

See United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40596, at *22 (N.D. Cal. May 23,
2007).
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access codes.28 Further, the creation and proliferation of application technology (also
known as “apps”) has exponentially increased the amount of personal information
that can be stored on a cell phone.29 These programs can store sensitive personal
information, such as the balance of a user’s checking account. 30 Social network
applications such as Facebook allow users to “check in” to the locations they visit,
creating a record of an individual’s day-to-day activities and the locations they
frequent.31 The technological capabilities available to smartphone users have created
the ability to capture a snapshot of an individual’s social interactions, bank account
balance, shopping preferences, and daily routine, to name a few. In today’s society,
smartphones have the capacity to elicit more personal information about its user than
a private investigator likely could, and with the single click of an icon. The privacy
concerns raised by smartphones do not merely deserve a heightened level of protection
in the warrantless search context, they command it.
With technological advancement, so too comes a reduction of privacy. “As
societies continue to integrate cell phones into every aspect of life and work, the
potential privacy and security problems only grow.” 32 Although the wireless
capabilities of cell phones have improved the personal and business life of users, it
necessarily entails the digitization of information, which then becomes easily
accessible to whosever hands the portable device falls into. Even the briefest search of
the most basic cell phone can reveal an incredible amount of personal information. 33
Courts should tread lightly on permitting searches of such personal effects. However,
since the creation and technological development of cell phones occurred centuries
after exceptions to the Fourth Amendment were developed to uphold certain
warrantless searches, courts have continued to permit such searches and, thus, the
violation of constitutional protections. To understand the current jurisprudence
dealing with governmental search and seizure of a cell phone, one must start at the
beginning of search and seizure law.
B. Fourth Amendment History and Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

28. Jamie Lendino, Kill Your Phone Remotely, PCMag.com (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.pcmag.com/

article2/0,2817,2352755,00.asp.
29. Applications are individual programs capable of performing specific tasks such as word processing,

video gaming, or online banking. Smartphone, Encyclopedia Britannica Online, http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1498102/smartphone (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
30. Block, supra note 3.
31.

Facebook Introduces Check-In Feature, CNN (Aug. 18, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-18/tech/
facebook.location_1_facebook-friends-facebook-executives-facebook-staff?_s=PM:TECH.

32.

Andrew Harris et al., Emerging Privacy and Security Concerns for Digital Wallet Deployment, in Privacy
in America 185 (William Aspray & Philip Doty eds., 2011).

33.

See Berry, supra note 17.
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unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”34 The U.S. Supreme Court
has interpreted the Fourth Amendment as demanding that officers must either have
a warrant to search an individual or have probable cause to believe the person they
are about to search has committed a crime.35 It is well settled that the drafters of the
Fourth Amendment were motivated by their fear of the writs of assistance and
general warrants often issued by the legislature of England.36 Under these decrees,
officers were given general authority to search an individual’s effects and even private
residences.37 Thus, the drafters of our constitution sought to protect individuals from
such searches and seizures.38 The Supreme Court has held that “searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.”39
Such exceptions become relevant after a “warrantless search,” which occurs when
a police officer executes a search without first obtaining a warrant from a neutral
magistrate to do so. Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches may only
be conducted where there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.40
But searches are often conducted for reasons other than an officer’s probable cause to
believe that a suspect committed a crime, and are permitted under exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. For example, officers may conduct an
inventory search of a suspect or his vehicle after he is arrested in order to ensure the
protection of the suspect’s property.41 In other instances officers may search an
individual for public safety reasons.42 In yet another circumstance, officers are
permitted to search a suspect following his lawful arrest for concealed weapons or
evidence in order to protect the officer or to prevent the destruction of evidence.43
These exceptions recognize that particular types of searches, although conducted
without prior approval of a neutral magistrate, are justified by other considerations.
1. Search Incident to Arrest
A “search incident to arrest” refers to the search an officer conducts on a suspect
at the time of arrest. The officer will search for any concealed weapons the suspect
34. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
35.

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

36. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977) (“It cannot be doubted that the Fourth Amendment’s

commands grew in large measure out of the colonists’ experience with the writs of assistance and their
memories of the general warrants formerly in use in England.”).
37.

Id.

38. See generally U.S. Const. amend. IV.
39.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (footnote omitted).

40. See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
41.

See United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 412 (4th Cir. 2009).

42.

United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1260 (10th Cir. 2011).

43.

Id.
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may use against the officer after he is put in custody or any evidence the suspect may
seek to destroy while in custody. At the adoption of the Bill of Rights courts were
already recognizing warrantless searches conducted pursuant to valid arrests for the
above-listed purpose. However, the search incident to arrest exception became
increasingly muddled in the years that followed.44 Although the justifications for the
constitutionality of a search incident to arrest—police safety and prevention of
evidence destruction—are narrow, these searches necessarily encompass much more
than just weapons and evidence as the exception does not restrict officers from only
discovering these particular items from the suspect.
By the 1950s, many believed that the search incident to arrest exception had
virtually “swallowed up” the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.45
During the 1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a search incident to arrest
extended to the entire premises of the arrest location.46 In 1969, recognizing the
broad expansion of search incident to arrest jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court
sought to clarify the rationale for and narrow the scope of the exception. In the
landmark case of Chimel v. California, the Court held that the exception was carved
out solely to maintain officer safety and prevent the destruction of evidence.47
Overruling two prior cases, Harris v. United States48 and United States v. Rabinowitz,49
the Court held that the exception was limited to the arrestee’s person and the area
“‘within his immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”50 The
Court in Chimel ominously admonished that “[n]o consideration relevant to the
Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational limitation, once the search is
allowed to go beyond the area from which the person arrested might obtain weapons
or evidentiary items.”51
Indeed, it was not long before the outer limits of Chimel were tested. In 1973, the
Supreme Court was presented with the question of how to treat an object found
within the immediate control, or grab area, of the arrestee.52 In United States v.
Robinson, the defendant was lawfully arrested for driving with a revoked operator’s
44. Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure 289 (8th ed. 2007).
45.

Jerold H. Israel & Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure: Constitutional limitations 107
(7th ed. 2006).

46. See Porter v. Ashmore, 421 F.2d 1186, 1190 (4th Cir. 1970) (“[A] search incident to a lawful arrest may

extend beyond the immediate vicinity of the one arrested.”).
47.

395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).

48. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
49. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
50. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51.

Id. at 766; cf. Harris, 331 U.S. at 197 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The difficulty with this problem for me
is that once the search is allowed to go beyond the person arrested and the objects upon him or in his
immediate physical control, I see no practical limit short of that set in the opinion of the Court—and
that means to me no limit at all.”).

52.

See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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permit.53 Pursuant to the arrest, officers conducted a search of the defendant’s person
and recovered a crumpled cigarette package from the left breast pocket of his coat.54
At trial, the arresting officer testified that, upon manipulating the package in his
hand, he knew the contents of the package were not cigarettes.55 At the scene, the
officer opened the package, revealing fourteen capsules of what were later verified to
be heroin.56 The Court upheld the search of the cigarette package finding that it was
conducted within the parameters of the search incident to arrest exception. “Having
in the course of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, [the
officer] was entitled to inspect it.”57 The Court noted,
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while
based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on
what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest
situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of
the suspect.58

With this decision, the Court ushered in a new era of searches incident to arrest,
and established a bright-line rule under which closed containers became fair game
for officers to search without violating the Fourth Amendment.59 The Court
essentially held that officers are well within their rights to actually open and search
the contents of closed containers, rather than having the authority only to seize them
and obtain a warrant to search them at a later juncture. The dissent in Robinson
admonished, however, that the search fell entirely short of the clearly delineated
rationales of Chimel60 and, indeed, fell outside the scope of the search incident to
arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, explaining that
[t]he search conducted . . . went far beyond what was reasonably necessary to
protect [the officer] from harm or to ensure that respondent would not effect
an escape from custody . . . [I]t therefore fell outside the scope of a properly
53.

Id. at 220.

54. Id. at 223.
55.

Id.

56. Id.
57.

Id. at 236.

58. Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
59.

See Andrew Fois & Lauren Simmons, Thomas Jefferson’s Carriage: Arizona v. Gant’s Assault on the Belton
Doctrine, Crim. L. Brief, Winter 2009, at 5–6.
In United States v. Robinson, the Supreme Court drew another bright-line rule delineating
the permissible scope of the search of the person of an arrestee incident to his arrest. In
that case, Robinson was legally arrested for driving an automobile after his operator’s
permit was revoked. During a full custodial search of Robinson’s person, the arresting
officer discovered a crumpled up cigarette package containing packets of heroin in
Robinson’s breast pocket. The evidence was admitted in his trial and led to his conviction
for a narcotics offense.
Id. (footnotes omitted).

60. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 259 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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drawn ‘search incident to arrest’ exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement.61

Relying on Robinson, federal circuit courts of appeal have upheld as constitutional
searches of various objects, considering them closed containers searchable pursuant
to a lawful arrest. In United States v. Molinaro, the Seventh Circuit upheld the search
of an arrestee’s wallet.62 The court explicitly relied on Robinson for its holding,
explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court has upheld warrantless searches of an arrestee’s
person, including personal property contained in his pockets, as a search incident to
arrest.”63 The Seventh Circuit later relied on Molinaro to uphold the search and
photocopying of an arrestee’s address book in United States v. Rodriguez.64 With
virtually no supporting analysis, relying only on a citation to Robinson, the Seventh
Circuit greatly expanded the scope of the search incident to arrest exception. The
Seventh Circuit’s holding declared it constitutional for officers to search almost
anything found on the arrestee’s person despite the fact that the item, by virtue of its
seizure, becomes secured and presents no danger to the officer or risk of its own
destruction, ignoring the very rationales of the exception justifying the search. As
the law stands today, if an officer arrests an individual based on probable cause, she
may, incident to that lawful arrest, search the entire person of that individual and the
area within that person’s immediate control, including any and all closed containers
found on their person or within their immediate control.65
However, in 1977, in the landmark case of United States v. Chadwick, the Supreme
Court abrogated Molinaro and Rodriguez. In Chadwick, the Court held that certain
containers may not be searched as incident to arrest.66 In Chadwick, the defendants
were suspected of trafficking drugs in a footlocker, which was locked with both a
padlock and a regular trunk lock.67 After the defendants were lawfully arrested, the
footlocker was taken into federal custody and eventually searched without consent
and without a warrant.68 The Court held:
By placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents
manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public
61.

Id.

62. United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1346–47 (7th Cir. 1989).
63. Id. at 1346 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. 218).
64. 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993).
65.

See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224.

66. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (“Warrantless searches of luggage or other property

seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the ‘search is remote
in time or place from the arrest,’ or no exigency exists. Once law enforcement officers have reduced
luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their
exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property
to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.”
(citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964))).
67.

Id. at 4–5.

68. Id.
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examination. No less than one who locks the doors of his home against
intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is due
the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause. There being no
exigency, it was unreasonable for the Government to conduct this search
without the safe-guards a judicial warrant provides.69

Essentially, Chadwick stood for the proposition that certain closed containers have
such a great expectation of privacy that, where no exigency exists, the issuance of a
warrant is necessary prior to the search of the closed container.70 Although Chadwick
partially remains good law, it was explicitly overruled in the context of searches
incident to arrest applied to searches of vehicles, as discussed in the following
section.71 This is because arrests of occupants, or recent occupants, of vehicles,
pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception, are governed by different rules
than ordinary searches incident to arrest.
i. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception’s Application to Occupants of a
Vehicle
In 1981, the Supreme Court wrestled with the search incident to arrest exception’s
application to occupants of a vehicle.72 In New York v. Belton, the Court addressed
the question of whether the passenger compartment73 of a vehicle constituted the
area within the immediate control of an arrestee and was therefore searchable under
the search incident to arrest exception.74 In Belton, an officer pulled over a vehicle for
excessive speed and all four occupants were lawfully arrested for unlawful possession
of marijuana.75 Subsequent to those arrests the vehicle, which the defendants had
been occupants of, was searched.76 On the backseat of the vehicle was a jacket
belonging to Roger Belton, one of the defendants.77 The officer began to search the
69. Id. at 11 n.4.
70. See generally id.
71.

See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579–80 (1991). In Acevedo the court held that arrests of
occupants, or recent occupants, of vehicles, pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception, are
governed by different rules than ordinary searches incident to arrest.

72. Id.
73.

The term ‘passenger compartment’ . . . has been construed to mean all areas reachable
without existing [sic] the vehicle, without regard to the likelihood that such reaching
actually occurred in the particular case. But . . . does not permit the dismantling of the
vehicle to get inside door panels, the opening of sealed containers, or other searches
into particular places to which the arrest unquestionably had no chance of accessing
immediately preceding his apprehension or exit from the vehicle.
Israel & LaFave, supra note 45, at 115.

74.

See Belton, 453 U.S. at 455–56.

75. Id. at 456.
76. Id.
77.

Id.

1140

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 56 | 2011/12

jacket, unzipped the pockets, and recovered cocaine.78 At the point the jacket was
searched and the cocaine recovered, all four defendants had been placed outside the
vehicle and separated from one another.79
The Court, in repudiating the “immediate control” limitation articulated in
Chimel, found the search constitutional on the grounds that it was incident to the
arrest, holding that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that automobile.”80 The Court also elaborated
on the search of closed containers first announced in Robinson, holding that “the
police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger
compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so
also will containers in it be within his reach.”81 The Court defined a closed container
as “any object capable of holding another object. It thus includes . . . luggage, boxes,
bags, clothing, and the like.”82
After Belton, searches incident to arrest of an automobile’s occupant are
constitutional even if they are not searches of the area solely within the immediate
control of the arrestee or justified by the two rationales of Chimel, i.e., to maintain
officer safety or prevent the destruction of evidence.83 The search incident to arrest
exception for automobile searches was further broadened by Thorton v. United States,
in which the Supreme Court justified searches of “recent occupants” of an
automobile—that is, those who had already exited the vehicle before being confronted
by police.84 Thus the Court’s ominous admonition in Chimel regarding the expansion
of the search incident to arrest exception had come to fruition.85 The Court had
effectively withdrawn any limits on the constitutionality of a search incident to
arrest, having extended the exception to searches involving “recent” occupants of a
vehicle and to searches of the passenger compartment regardless of whether the
arrestee was in reaching distance of the search area.86

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 460 (footnote omitted).
81.
82.

Id. at 460–61 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959)).
Id. at 461 n.4.

83. See id. at 461 (“It is true, of course, that these containers will sometimes be such that they could hold

neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested.”).
84. See Thorton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 622 (2004) (“Belton allows police to search the passenger

compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful custodial arrest of both ‘occupants’ and ‘recent occupants’”
(citing Belton, 453 U.S. at 460)).
85. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969).
86. See generally New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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In 2009, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant attempted to reign in the Belton
runaway train87:
Under [a] broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search would be authorized
incident to every arrest of a recent occupant notwithstanding that in most
cases the vehicle’s passenger compartment will not be within the arrestee’s
reach at the time of the search. To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search
incident to every recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from
the justifications underlying the Chimel exception.88

After Gant, officers may only search the passenger compartment of a vehicle while
the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment
when the officers have reasonable suspicion that evidence of the crime for which the
defendant was originally arrested might be contained within the vehicle.89 Gant’s
application of the search incident to arrest exception to recent occupants of an
automobile should not be confused with the separate and distinct automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment, discussed in the following section.
2. The Automobile Exception
In 1925, in Carroll v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless
search of a vehicle where its occupants were not under arrest and the officers
conducting the search did not have probable cause to arrest the defendants prior to
the search.90 The officers did, however, have probable cause to believe that evidence
of a crime would be found within the vehicle.91 The search had been conducted in
1921, during Prohibition, near the United States’ Canadian border in an area known
for bootlegging.92 Upon recognizing the defendants as bootleggers in an area known
for bootlegging, federal agents pulled the defendants over and proceeded to search
the vehicle, recovering sixty-nine quarts of bonded whiskey and gin in the upholstery
of the seats.93 The Court upheld the search as constitutional because the application
for a warrant was impracticable:
[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the
Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of
the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a
store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official
warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or
87.

Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (“The chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton
includes courts, scholars, and Members of this Court who have questioned that decision’s clarity and its
fidelity to Fourth Amendment principles.”).

88. Id. at 1719.
89. See id. at 1710–19.
90. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
91.

Id.

92.

Id. at 160.

93.

Id. at 174.
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automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.94

Thus, the automobile exception, or the so-called “Carroll Doctrine,” was born.
Where probable cause exists to believe that evidence of the suspected crime will be
found within the vehicle, no warrant or prior arrest is necessary to search the vehicle.95
The rationale of Carroll rested on the inherent mobility of the vehicle and, thus, the
potential loss of evidence.96 For this reason, the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment is separate and distinct from the search incident to arrest exception.97
The rationale underlying the automobile exception, like other exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment, eventually evolved over time to include more than what was
originally contemplated when the exception was created. In 1985, the U.S. Supreme
Court added a further rationale to Carroll ’s mobility justification.98 In California v.
Carney, federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents entered the motor
home of a man suspected of selling marijuana for sex.99 The Supreme Court held
that, “[b]esides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern
because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly
less than that relating to one’s home or office.”100
Thus, a diminished expectation of privacy in one’s automobile became another
rationale underlying the automobile exception and, by most scholars’ interpretations,
the primary rationale.101 However, this rationale proved to further the confusion that
94. Id. at 153.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97.

Because there is no arrest, the occupants of the vehicle are not detained and are free to move the vehicle
quickly outside the jurisdiction of the officers wishing to conduct the search. See Israel & LaFave,
supra note 45, at 115.

98. See generally California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
99. Id. at 387–88.
100. Id. at 391 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In South Dakota v. Opperman, the Court expounded upon this holding by stating:
Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the
expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that
relating to one’s home or office. In discharging their varied responsibilities for ensuring
the public safety, law enforcement officials are necessarily brought into frequent contact
with automobiles. Most of this contact is distinctly noncriminal in nature. Automobiles,
unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and
controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday
occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers
have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted,
or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order.
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
101. Id.; Saltzburg & Capra, supra note 44, at 41; Jaclyn L. McAndrew, Who Has More Privacy?: State v.

Brown and Its Effect on South Carolina Criminal Defendants, 62 S.C. L. Rev. 671, 681–82 (2011).
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already existed in case law defining the automobile exception. The confusion had
developed mainly due to the principle announced in United States v. Chadwick: because
certain closed containers—such as luggage—“are intended as a repository of personal
effects,” it is reasonable for someone to have a greater expectation of privacy in them,
and, therefore, in the context of a search incident to arrest, a warrant is necessary to
open the closed container.102 It was not long after the Court’s holding in Chadwick
that questions arose as to whether Chadwick applied to automobile exception cases—
specifically, whether closed containers found pursuant to the automobile exception
(not only pursuant to searches incident to arrest) necessitate a warrant.103
In California v. Acevedo, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this confusion.104
The Court interpreted Carroll as “providing one rule to govern all automobile
searches.”105 In Acevedo, the Court held that it is constitutional for law enforcement
to “search an automobile and the containers within it when they have probable cause
to believe contraband or evidence is contained” within the automobile.106 The Court
therefore effectively rejected Chadwick’s warrant requirement for closed containers in
searches conducted according to the automobile exception.107 However, Acevedo
concerned closed containers that belonged to the owner and driver of the vehicle. As
such, it was unclear whether the bright-line rule announced in Acevedo also allowed
the warrantless search of closed containers belonging to passengers of the vehicle.
In Wyoming v. Houghton, the Supreme Court was presented with that exact
question.108 The Court opted to extend the bright-line rule to closed containers
belonging to passengers, holding that “police officers with probable cause to search a
car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing
the object of the search.”109 The Court, in a majority opinion authored by Justice
Scalia, reasoned that
[w]hen there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable
for police officers—like customs officials in the founding era—to examine
packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause
for each one. A passenger’s personal belongings, just like the driver’s
belongings or containers attached to the car like a glove compartment, are
“in” the car, and the officer has probable cause to search for contraband in the
102. 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
103. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (holding that a warrant is required to search a suitcase that

had been placed in the trunk of a taxi); cf. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding that no
warrant was necessary to search a paper bag and pouch found inside the vehicle).
104. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
105. Id. at 580.
106. Id.
107. Id. (“Until today, this Court has drawn a curious line between the search of an automobile that

coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an
automobile. The protections of the Fourth Amendment must not turn on such coincidences.”).
108. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
109. Id. at 307.
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car . . . . Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of
privacy with regard to the property that they transport in cars, which “travel
public thoroughfares, seldom serve as . . . the repository of personal effects,”
are subjected to police stop and examination to enforce “pervasive”
governmental controls “as an everyday occurrence,” and, finally, are exposed
to traffic accidents that may render all their contents open to public scrutiny.110

Thus, as the law currently stands, any closed container found within a vehicle,
regardless of whom it belongs to, is subject to search pursuant to the automobile
exception without need for a warrant when there is probable cause that evidence may
be found within the container.111
3. Exigent Circumstances
A third exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement arises in
exigent circumstances, which exist when immediate governmental action is necessary
either to prevent flight, to maintain the safety of police or the public, or to protect
against the destruction of evidence.112 The Supreme Court stated that “searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable but . . . this
presumption may be overcome . . . . when the exigencies of the situation make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”113Accordingly, the exigent circumstances
exception is divided into three separate subcategories: hot pursuit, police and public
safety, and risk of destruction of evidence.114 Only the third category is relevant for
purposes of this note and an analysis of cell phone searches.
First announced in 1966 in Schmerber v. California, a risk of the destruction of
evidence excuses the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment if the “delay
necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threaten[s] ‘the destruction
of evidence.’”115 This exception is commonly invoked in criminal cases involving
narcotics because of the ease with which evidence can be discarded, such as by
flushing the drugs down the toilet.116
For example, in United States v. MacDonald, the Second Circuit upheld the
warrantless search of an apartment based in part on the risk of a destruction of

110. Id. at 302–03 (alterations in original) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974); South

Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)).
111. See generally Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565.
112. See Saltzburg & Capra, supra note 44, at 363.
113. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1852 (2011) (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)).
114. See id. at 1865.
115. 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
116. See Saltzburg & Capra, supra note 44, at 368.
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narcotics and prerecorded buy money.117 In MacDonald, pursuant to an informant’s
tip that drugs were being stored and sold in an apartment, an undercover New York
Drug Enforcement (NYDEA) Task Force agent went to the apartment and
successfully transacted a drug sale with prerecorded buy money.118 While inside, the
undercover agent observed large quantities of marijuana and cocaine, large stacks of
money, several men, and several weapons.119 The undercover agent left the apartment
and returned shortly thereafter with other NYDEA agents.120 Upon knocking on
the apartment door and identifying themselves, the agents heard rummaging inside
and were told by agents remaining outside the building that some men were
attempting to exit through the apartment’s bathroom window.121 At that point the
agents forced their way into the apartment, arrested five men from within, recovered
two loaded weapons, a substantial amount of cocaine and marijuana, drug
paraphernalia, drug packaging supplies, and large amounts of cash.122 The court held
that, based on the circumstances, the NYDEA agents’ warrantless search was
permissible because the agents were “confronted by an urgent need to prevent the
possible loss of evidence.”123 MacDonald implicitly demonstrates the requirement
that, in order to proceed with a warrantless search under this exception, there must
be some indication that someone was in a position to destroy the evidence.124
In Vale v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court explicitly announced this rule.125 In Vale,
the defendant was arrested outside his home.126 Shortly after his arrest, while officers
were still present with him outside the home, his mother and brother walked up to
the house carrying groceries.127 The relatives were kept outside the home while the
officers went inside, initially conducting a protective sweep to verify that no one else
was inside.128 The officers then proceeded to conduct a thorough search of the entire
premises without a warrant.129 The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the search as
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment’s exigent circumstances exception,
117. 916 F.2d 766, 770 (2d Cir. 1990). Pre-recorded buy money is money that has been previously marked by

law enforcement agents. The pre-recordation of the money helps to prove that a drug transaction
transpired if such money is later recovered from a defendant.
118. Id. at 768.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 770 (citing United States v. Miles, 889 F.2d 382, 383 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Campbell,

581 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1978)).
124. See MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770; see also United States v. Howard, 106 F.3d 70, 77 (5th Cir. 1997).
125. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
126. Id. at 32.
127. Id. at 33.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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specifically finding a risk that evidence of drugs could easily be destroyed.130 The
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the state court’s analysis, explaining that
[s]uch a rationale could not apply to the present case, since by their own
account the arresting officers satisfied themselves that no one else was in the
house when they first entered the premises. But entirely apart from that
point, our past decisions make clear that only in “a few specifically established
and well-delineated” situations may a warrantless search of a dwelling
withstand constitutional scrutiny, even though the authorities have probable
cause to conduct it. The burden rests on the State to show the existence of
such an exceptional situation. And the record before us discloses none.131

Thus, the Court held that there must be a showing that someone was in a position to
destroy evidence in order to invoke this as grounds for conducting a search under the
exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.132
III. PAGER CASES AS AN ANALOG FOR PRESENT-DAY (WARRANTLESS) SEARCHES
OF CELL PHONES

The limits and the underlying rationales of the three aforementioned exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement have been tested in cases involving
electronic devices capable of storing personal information.
The first major information-storing device that was analyzed under these
exceptions was the pager. Pagers, however, were slow to gain public interest, and it
was not until the 1980s and early 1990s that the pager gained national popularity.133
Unlike cell phones that contain a wealth of capabilities, pagers can merely relay callback numbers entered into a phone carrier’s automated system.134
Shortly after pagers gained national popularity courts began to wrestle with the
Fourth Amendment’s application to warrantless searches of these electronic devices.
The decisions that came out of this era laid the foundation for evaluating warrantless
cell phone searches in the decades that followed. This section tracks the development
of warrantless pager search jurisprudence, demonstrating that courts almost uniformly
upheld warrantless searches of pagers under the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
Warrant Clause. Specifically, pagers were analogized to previously defined closed
containers such as address books, which are searchable under the exceptions.
130. See State v. Vale, 215 So.2d 811 (La. 1968), rev’d, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
131. Vale, 399 U.S. at 34 (citations omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
132. See id.
133. Bernice Kanner, The Beep Generation, N.Y. Mag., Aug. 15, 1983, at 12.
134. Glynis Frater, GCSE Business and Communication Systems 174 (2003).

Pagers or ‘beepers’ are a portable communication messenger device. The person sending
the message uses a [touch]-tone phone and calls the pager’s number, then the person enters
their number or voice message and within moments the pager carrier is notified by an
audible ‘beep’ or silent vibration. The number or voice message can be read on the pager’s
screen. The pager’s secret is that inside that little case is a simple, yet sophisticated receiver.
Id.

1147

GETTING BACK TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: WARRANTLESS CELL PHONE SEARCHES

A. Cases Addressing the Constitutionality of Warrantless Pager Searches
Courts began evaluating the constitutionality of warrantless searches of pagers in
the early 1990s and almost always denied the defendants’ motions to suppress evidence
obtained through those searches.135 In United States v. Chan, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California upheld a warrantless search of a pager as a
lawful search incident to arrest.136 Sam Tong Chan was arrested as part of an
undercover investigation into the illegal distribution of heroin.137 Undercover agents
had previously witnessed a co-defendant place a phone call to an unknown individual
to secure the heroin.138 The co-defendant then rendezvoused with Chan inside of a
vehicle.139 Both men were arrested after the co-defendant exited the vehicle with the
heroin.140 At the time of Chan’s arrest, he had a pager in his possession.141 The
undercover agents searched the pager’s memory, without first obtaining a warrant,
and discovered that Chan was in fact the person whom the co-defendant had called to
secure the heroin.142 Although the court found that Chan had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the contents of his pager, it went on to hold that this privacy interest was
“irrelevant . . . because the pager was searched incident to Chan’s arrest.”143 With little
further explanation, the court found that the pager was a closed container and
therefore could be searched pursuant to Belton without a warrant under the search
incident to arrest exception of the Fourth Amendment.144
Courts thereafter followed Chan and upheld warrantless searches of pagers as
closed containers searchable under the search incident to arrest and exigent
circumstances exceptions to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause. In United
States v. Ortiz, the defendant Ortiz was arrested as part of an undercover investigation
by federal authorities for the illegal distribution of heroin.145 The agents had
previously arrested a co-defendant for the sale of heroin.146 The co-defendant agreed
to cooperate and provided Ortiz’s pager number.147 The agents called the pager from
135. See generally United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding warrantless search of a pager

as lawful search incident to arrest); United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (upholding
warrantless search of a pager as lawful search incident to arrest).
136. 830 F. Supp. at 535.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 533.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 535.
144. Id. at 536 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)).
145. 84 F.3d 977, 980–82 (7th Cir. 1996).
146. Id. at 982.
147. Id.
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a Shell gas station and set up a meeting to purchase more heroin from Oritz.148 Upon
Mr. Ortiz’s arrest, agents recovered the pager.149 They activated the pager’s memory
and verified that it contained the number of the Shell gas station from which the
agents had contacted Mr. Ortiz.150 The Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality
of the search under the incident to arrest exception, explaining:
Because of the finite nature of a pager’s electronic memory, incoming pages
may destroy currently stored telephone numbers in a pager’s memory. . . .
Thus, it is imperative that law enforcement officers have the authority to
immediately “search” or retrieve, incident to a valid arrest, information from
a pager in order to prevent its destruction as evidence.151

Other Fourth Amendment exceptions were also found to apply to warrantless
searches of pagers. For example, in United States v. Hunter, the Fourth Circuit upheld
the warrantless search of the defendant’s pager on the basis of exigent circumstances.152
In Hunter, the defendant was arrested upon the execution of a search warrant secured
by the DEA.153 At the time of his arrest, the defendant had in his possession a pager,
which the agents searched and which contained several telephone numbers that were
used as evidence against him in his trial.154 The Fourth Circuit held that “exigent
circumstances surrounding the potentially fleeting nature of the evidence contained
in a pager justifies a warrantless ‘search’ of the contents of the pager.”155
Most of the courts that have analyzed warrantless searches of pagers have
emphasized the limited storage capacity of pagers as the key factor in upholding a
warrantless search. 156 However, one district court offered a very different rationale for
upholding a warrantless search of the defendant’s pager.157 In United States v. Lynch, the
defendant was arrested by DEA agents after receiving a suitcase of cocaine from his
co-defendant in a hotel room in Atlanta, Georgia.158 At the time of the defendant’s
arrest, the agents searched his pager, which contained various numbers in its memory.159
Relying on Robinson and its progeny, which held that officers may search closed

148. Id.
149. Id. at 983.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 984 (citing United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 957 (6th Cir. 1990)).
152. No. 96-4259, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27765, at *10 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 1998).
153. Id. at *3.
154. Id. at *8.
155. See id. at *10 (citing Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996)).
156. See Ortiz, 84 F.3d at 984; see also Hunter, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27765, at *10.
157. See generally United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284 (D.V.I. 1995).
158. Id. at 286.
159. Id.
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containers on the person of a suspect incident to a lawful arrest,160 the court held that
“[j]ust as police can lawfully search the contents of an arrestee’s wallet or address book
incident to an arrest, we hold that the agents here could lawfully search the contents of
[the defendant’s] pager incident to his arrest.”161 The court, sidestepping the holding in
Chadwick requiring a search warrant for closed container searches, explained:
The [Supreme Court] in Chadwick noted that the search of the footlocker was
not a search of the “person . . . justified by . . . reduced expectations of privacy
caused by the arrest.” Since a search of the “person” has been held to include
a person’s wallet or address book, we find that a search of Thomas’ pager was
a search of his “person” and thus was valid.162

The aforementioned pager cases played an integral role in how courts would later
apply the Fourth Amendment’s exceptions to cell phone searches. The courts in the
pager cases pulled the first thread that would eventually unravel the Fourth
Amendment protection against searches of modern-day cell phones. Courts analogized
cell phones to pagers because at the time of their creation, cell phones represented the
next step in technology, essentially allowing the cell phone user to receive a phone call
directly instead of receiving just the call back number as with pagers. The holdings
that pagers, the direct predecessors to cell phones, were freely searchable as closed
containers would later allow courts to hold that cell phones were also searchable as
closed containers. This analysis, however, did not account for the dramatic differences
in the information-storing capacity between the two technologies and, in turn, the
heightened privacy expectations and concerns involved in a cell phone search.
B. Cases Addressing the Constitutionality of Warrantless Cell Phone Searches
Many courts have wrestled with the application of the search incident to arrest,
the automobile, and the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement. Although sometimes recognizing the existence of heightened
privacy expectations unique to cell phones, courts have almost uniformly held that
cell phones are closed containers and thus searchable under the exceptions of the
Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause.
1. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception as Applied to Cell Phone Searches
In 2005, in United States v. Cote, the U.S. District Court for the North District
of Illinois became one of the first courts to evaluate the constitutionality of a
warrantless search of a cell phone, and the court looked for guidance in Robinson and

160. Id. at 288 (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the search of

address book was valid search incident to arrest)); see also United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341,
1346 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding the search of wallet valid incident to arrest).
161. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. at 288 (D.V.I. 1995).
162. Id. at 288–89 (second and third alteration in origianl) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,

15, 16 n.10 (1977)).
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its progeny.163 In Cote, the defendant was arrested for attempting to engage in sexual
acts with a minor.164 At the time of his arrest the defendant was carrying a cell
phone, which FBI agents seized and searched without a warrant—specifically
searching the recent calls log, address book, and e-mail inbox.165 The court held that
the warrantless search of the defendant’s cell phone was “made incident to a valid
arrest,” likening the search of the defendant’s cell phone to searches of wallets and
address books, which have been deemed constitutional when made incident to
arrest.166 Similarly, when the District of Massachusetts in United States v. Wurie was
presented with the same issue, it too relied on the Robinson line of cases to uphold
the warrantless search of a cell phone under the search incident to arrest exception.167
In Wurie, the court concluded that there is “no principled basis for distinguishing a
warrantless search of a cell phone from the search of other types of personal
containers found on a defendant’s person.”168
Many courts presented with questions about the constitutionality of warrantless
searches of cell phones, including the Fifth and Fourth Circuits, looked back to the
analyses employed in the pager cases. In United States v. Finley, the defendant was
arrested for aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.169
At the time of his arrest, the defendant had on his person a cell phone, which was
seized and later searched without a warrant by a DEA agent.170 Specifically, the agent
searched the defendant’s recent call log and text messages.171 The court explained that
[p]olice officers are not constrained to search only for weapons or instruments
of escape on the arrestee’s person; they may also, without any additional
justification, look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime on his person in order to
preserve it for use at trial. The permissible scope of a search incident to a
lawful arrest extends to containers found on the arrestee’s person.172
163. United States v. Cote, No. 03 CR 271, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11725 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2005), aff ’d,

504 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2007).
164. Id. at *6.
165. Id. at *19.
166. Id. (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d

1341, 1346–47 (7th Cir. 1989)).
167. United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2009).
168. Id. (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993) (contents of an address book in

arrestee’s wallet); United States v. Rust, 650 F.2d 927, 928 (8th Cir. 1981) (arrestee’s pockets); United
States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349, 355 (7th Cir. 1979) (hand-held luggage); United States v. Castro, 596
F.2d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1979) (man’s wallet); United States v. Moreno, 569 F.2d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir.
1978) (woman’s purse)). The court cites these cases as examples of other personal containers found on
the person which the court does not distinguish from cell phones found on the person.
169. 477 F.3d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 2007).
170. Id. at 254.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 259–60 (citation omitted) (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981); United States

v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 233–34 (1973); United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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The court in Finley, citing Ortiz (in which the court upheld the warrantless search of
a pager under the search incident to arrest exception), held that the agent was
“permitted to search Finley’s cell phone pursuant to his arrest.”173 Likewise, in United
States v. Young, the Fourth Circuit, citing Hunter (in which the court upheld the
warrantless search of a pager under the exigent circumstances exception) and Finley,
upheld the warrantless search of a cell phone.174 The court in Young also pointed to
the “manifest need of the officers to preserve evidence” due to the fact that the
officers “had no way of knowing whether the text messages would automatically
delete themselves or be preserved” as support for upholding the search.175
Other courts faced with the same issue opted to apply a different analysis,
grounded in the possibility that the information stored on the cell phone could be
remotely deleted and thus a warrantless search satisfied the Chimel rationale to
prevent destruction of evidence. In United States v. Urbina, the defendant was arrested
pursuant to an arrest warrant at his home.176 At the time of the defendant’s arrest, a
detective recovered a cell phone from his person and conducted a search, specifically
viewing the phone’s address book and recent calls log.177 The officer later testified
that he conducted the search immediately because he feared that information he
sought on the phone could be remotely erased.178 In evaluating whether a cell phone
constitutes a closed container for the purposes of search incident to arrest, the court
explained that
countervailing [the] increased privacy interest [in a cell phone] is the increased
vulnerability of the data contained on a cell phone . . . the contents of a cell
phone may be easily deleted, either by the replacement of old data with new, a
mistaken push of a button, a loss of power, or even remotely by a person
contacting the cell phone provider.179

The court held that the warrantless search was constitutional as a search incident to
arrest because cell phones are closed containers and “data on a cell phone is vulnerable
to loss if not promptly searched.”180 The Urbina court implicitly found that the need to
search the phone at the time of the arrest derived from the risk of destruction of
evidence contained on the cell phone, that is, the second rationale for the search
incident to arrest exception under Chimel. However, despite the officer’s testimony and
the court’s reasoning, there was no evidence in Urbina that the defendant’s cell phone
was actually at risk of losing the data it contained; there was no evidence that the
173. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260 (citing United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996)).
174. See United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242 (4th Cir. 2008).
175. Id. at 245–46.
176. No. 06-CR-336, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96345, at *28 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2007).
177. Id. at *29.
178. Id. at *30.
179. Id. at *37–38 (citing United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349, 355 (7th Cir. 1979) (discussing that a search

of a wallet, purse or shoulder bag is permitted as a search incident to arrest)).
180. Id. at *38.
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phone was of the type that automatically deleted old messages or any evidence that an
individual was in a position to remotely delete information contained on the phone.
Similarly, in United States v. Murphy, the circuit court upheld the warrantless
search of a cell phone incident to arrest based on the generalized notion that
information stored on the phone could be lost.181 In Murphy, the defendant was
arrested for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine.182
The arresting officers seized the defendant’s cell phone as the result of an inventory
search of the vehicle in which the defendant was arrested.183 The cell phone was sent
to the DEA, where an agent searched the text messaging log.184 The fourth circuit
explained:
Citing the “manifest need . . . to preserve evidence,” this Court has held on at
least two prior occasions, albeit in unpublished opinions, that officers may
retrieve text messages and other information from cell phones and pagers
seized incident to an arrest. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit and Seventh Circuit
have held that the need for the preservation of evidence justifies the retrieval
of call records and text messages from a cell phone or pager without a warrant
during a search incident to arrest.185

The defendant argued that, under the court’s rationale, only those phones with
minimal storage capacity should be subject to the exception since those phones pose
a greater risk of having their archived information deleted, whereas phones with
large storage capacity do not present the same risk.186 The court rejected such a rule,
explaining that
to require police officers to ascertain the storage capacity of a cell phone
before conducting a search would simply be an unworkable and unreasonable
rule. It is unlikely that police officers would have any way of knowing whether
the text messages and other information stored on a cell phone will be
preserved or be automatically deleted simply by looking at the cell phone.187

Thus, those courts that have upheld warrantless searches of cell phones under the
original Chimel rationale based upon the risk of a destruction of evidence have been
satisfied in the mere possibility that the phone’s information could be lost or destroyed
without proof that the specific phone could have suffered the deletion of relevant
evidence.
181. 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 408.
184. Id. at 409.
185. Id. at 411 (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242, 245–46 (4th Cir.

2008); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hunter, No. 96-4259,
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27765, at *3 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 1998); United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984
(7th Cir. 1996)).
186. Murphy, 552 F.3d at 411.
187. Id. (citing Young, 278 F. App’x at 245).
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2. The Automobile Exception as Applied to Warrantless Cell Phone Searches
In United States v. Ball, the district court was faced with a challenge to a
warrantless cell phone search involving a vehicle and invoked the automobile
exception to uphold the search.188 In Ball, the defendant was arrested in a vehicle
following an undercover investigation into the illegal distribution of
methamphetamine.189 At the time of his arrest, the defendant was carrying a cell
phone, which the officers seized and searched.190 Without recognition of the
heightened privacy concerns unique to cell phones, the court upheld the search of the
cell phone as a search of a closed container. The court relied on the holding of a 1982
Supreme Court case that upheld the search of a brown paper bag as a closed container
searchable under the automobile exception.191 The court in Ball explained that:
Clearly, at the time of arrest the officers through the use of the cooperators,
independent investigation, and observations of the Defendant had probable
cause to believe that the vehicle would contain evidence of crimes. This
probable cause extended to the container and the cell phone as they were
likely places for the evidence of crimes or contraband to be found.192

Although the court in Ball employed very generalized reasoning for the application
of the automobile exception, other courts have been more detailed in their analyses.
In United States v. Cole, the defendant was arrested for unlawful possession of
marijuana.193 At the time of his arrest, officers seized several cell phones from the
defendant’s vehicle and gave them to a DEA agent who subsequently conducted a
search of the phone, specifically, the recent call log and the address book.194 The
court recognized that some courts have refused to apply the automobile exception to
warrantless searches of cell phones given “the vast amounts of data that some cell
phones contain or may store, making them more analogous to computers than
traditional telephones, pagers, or closed containers.”195 The court, however, did not
188. No. 04-03056-05-CR-S-RED, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24180 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 2005), aff ’d, 499

F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2007), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2049 (2009).
189. Id. at *8–9.
190. Id. at *3–4.
191. Id. at *9–10. In the 1982 case, United States v. Ross, the court declared “[i]f probable cause justifies the

search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents
that may conceal the object of the search.” 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
192. Ball, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24180, at *9–10 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 825).
193. No. 1:09-CR-0412-ODE-RGV, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82822, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2010).
194. Id. at *10.
195. Id. at *61 (citing United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Relying on analogies to

closed containers . . . may lead courts to oversimplify a complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines
and ignore the realities of massive modern computer storage.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State
v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009) (“Even the more basic models of modern cell phones are
capable of storing a wealth of digitized information wholly unlike any physical object found within a
closed container. We thus hold that a cell phone is not a closed container for purposes of a Fourth
Amendment analysis.”)).
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agree and found that the defendant’s cell phone constituted a closed container “in
that it contained information—recent calls, contacts’ telephone numbers, and so
forth—not readily apparent without manipulating the cell phone itself.”196
Similarly, in United States v. Meador, officers searched defendant’s cell phone, which
they had seized from his parents’ vehicle the day after he was arrested.197 Specifically,
the officers searched the call log and address book of defendant’s cell phone. Notably,
the court recognized that “[r]elying on analogies to closed containers . . . may lead
courts to oversimplify a complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore
the realities of massive modern computer storage.”198 Nonetheless, the court upheld
the search, explaining that
[c]ellular phones are well-known and recognized tools of the drug dealing
trade. Confronted with Meador’s cell phone and these historical facts, the
undersigned believes that a person of reasonable caution would believe that
contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the memory data of
Meador’s cellular phone. The officers therefore had probable cause to search
the cell phone’s memory.199

Following this same line of reasoning, the court in United States v. Suarez-Blanca
upheld the warrantless searches of the defendants’ cell phones.200 In that case, the
defendants were arrested for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute marijuana
and cocaine.201 At the time of their arrest, the defendants’ cell phones were seized
and later searched.202 The court explained that “cell phones, with their directories
and . . . memory of numbers recently or frequently called, are a known tool of the
drug trade.”203 The court held that since the defendants had either been seen on their
cell phones while participating in the illegal distribution of drugs or admitted calling
other members of the drug conspiracy on the cell phones, there was “a fair probability
that evidence of the crime for which Defendants had been arrested would be
located . . . in the cell phones.”204

196. Id. at *64.
197. No. 1:06 CR 134 CDP DDN, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92728, at *16, 21 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 7, 2008).
198. Id. at *38 (citing Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id. at *41–42 (quoting California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573, 580 (1991); United States v. Cleveland,

106 F.3d 1056, 1061 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Slater, 971 F.2d 626, 637 (10th Cir. 1992)).
200. No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111623 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2008).
201. Id. at *2.
202. Id. at *57.
203. Id. at *58–59 (citing United States v. Slater, 971 F.2d 626, 637 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that a cell phone

is a “recognized tool of the trade in drug dealing”); United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 900 (11th Cir.
1990) (stating that a cellular phone is “a known tool of the drug trade”); United States v. Wiseman, 158
F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1249 (D. Kan. 2001) (stating that it is “common knowledge in the courts . . . that
cellular phones, complete with memory of numbers recently or frequently called, or their ‘address books,’
are a known tool of the drug trade”)).
204. Id. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111623, at *64.
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In United States v. Garcia-Aleman, the defendants were arrested for possession of
cocaine that was found in their vehicle after it was lawfully stopped and then
searched.205 At the time of their arrest, officers seized the defendants’ cell phones
from their persons and forwarded them to DEA agents who conducted a thorough,
but warrantless, search.206 Specifically, an agent downloaded the address books and
the photographs stored on the phones.207 The court explained that cell phones are
considered “tools of the drug trade.”208 Therefore, the court held that “the automobile
exception gave law enforcement officers latitude to search Benitez’s cell phones like it
would allow the search of other closed containers in the pickup truck.”209
Thus courts have extended the reach of the automobile exception to cell phones
on the basis that cell phones are closed containers—despite often recognizing that
cell phones present unique privacy concerns not akin to personal effects previously
held to be closed containers.
3. The Exigent Circumstances Exception as Applied to Warrantless Cell Phone
Searches
United States v. Parada, one of the earliest cases to address a warrantless search of
a cell phone, justified the search in that case under the exigent circumstances
exception to the Fourth Amendment. 210 There, the defendants were arrested for
possession with intent to distribute PCP.211 A cell phone belonging to defendant
Parada was found in the vehicle containing the PCP and was given to a DEA agent
who conducted a warrantless search of the recent calls log.212 Citing the exigency
rationales proposed in the pager cases, the court held:
Because a cell phone has a limited memory to store numbers, the agent
recorded the numbers in the event that subsequent incoming calls effected the
deletion or overwriting of the earlier stored numbers. This can occur whether
the phone is turned on or off, so it is irrelevant whether the defendant or the
officers turned on the phone. The Court concludes that under these
circumstances, the agent had the authority to immediately search or retrieve,

205. See No. 1:10-CR-29, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65333 (E.D. Tex. June 9, 2010).
206. Id. at *10–11.
207. Id.
208. Id. at *36–37 (citing United States v. Munera-Uribe, No. 98-20438, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18426, at

*19 (5th Cir. Apr. 5, 1999); United States v. Cleveland, 106 F.3d 1056, 1061 (1st Cir. 1997); United
States v. Sasson, 62 F.3d 874, 886 (7th Cir. 1995)).
209. Garcia-Aleman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65333, at *37.
210. See United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (D. Kan. 2003), aff ’d in part, remanded in part sub

nom. United States v. McNeill, 136 F. App’x 153 (10th Cir. 2005).
211. Id. at 1295.
212. Id. at 1298.
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as a matter of exigency, the cell phone’s memory of stored numbers of
incoming phone calls, in order to prevent the destruction of this evidence. 213

In United States v. Zamora, the court also relied on the rationales underlying the
pager cases to uphold the warrantless search of a cell phone, as an apparently
analogous electronic device.214 In Zamora, the defendants were arrested for conspiring
to manufacture methamphetamine.215 At the time of their arrest, their cell phones
were seized and given to a DEA agent who searched the recent calls log without a
warrant.216 The agent testified at trial that “the contents of the cell phones can be
altered by each incoming call creating an exigency to conduct the search before the
cell phone memory is altered.”217 The court, relying on Ortiz, held that the warrantless
search in this case was permissible under the search incident to arrest exception or
the exigent circumstances exception since
[t]here is no material difference between the information retrieved from a
pager and the information retrieved from the cell phones in this case . . . .
....
[Therefore,] . . . the immediate searches of the cell phones taken from their
persons were lawful either as part of the search incident to arrest or based on
exigent circumstances. 218

Parada and Zamora demonstrate the early justifications courts relied upon in
holding that exigent circumstances rendered the warrantless searches of cell phones
constitutional. In those cases, the courts upheld the searches under the proposition
that all cell phones have a limited storage capacity and delete archived information to
make room for new incoming information, creating an exigency permitting officers
to search the cell phones before information is lost.219 More recently, however, courts
have justified the invocation of exigent circumstances on other grounds. In United
States v. Salgado, the defendant was arrested pursuant to a valid arrest warrant for
conspiring to distribute a controlled substance. 220 Subsequent to his arrest, agents
seized a phone that was in a pair of pants that the defendant wished to put on before
being transported to the station.221 An agent searched and recorded all the numbers
contained in the address book of defendant’s cell phone.222 At trial, the agent who
213. Id. at 1303–04
214. See No. 1:05-CR-250-WSD, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40775, at *33 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2005).
215. Id. at *3.
216. Id. at *31–32.
217. Id. at *32.
218. Id. at *33, *35.
219. See id.; United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (D. Kan. 2003), aff ’d in part, remanded in part sub

nom. United States v. McNeill, 136 F. App’x 153 (10th Cir. 2005).
220. No. 1:09-CR-454-CAP-ECS-5, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77266, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 15, 2010).
221. Id. at *4.
222. Id.
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searched the phone testified that there currently exists technology that allows users
to remotely delete information on their cell phones.223 The court held that “the search
of the cellular phone data was supported by exigent circumstances. At the time the
cellular phone came into Agent Barnes’ possession the data on the phone could have
been altered, erased, or deleted remotely.”224 This suggests that the possibility that
anyone can remotely delete information from a cell phone creates an exigency
justifying a warrantless search of a cell phone.
IV. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF CELL PHONES: WHY COURTS HAVE IT WRONG
AND HOW THEY CAN RETURN TO THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT

The foregoing cases have demonstrated the weakened Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches of cellular telephones, resulting from two
primary factors: First, many courts have held that cell phones are closed containers
that may be lawfully searched without a warrant under both the search incident to
arrest exception and the automobile exception of the Fourth Amendment.225 Second,
in exigent circumstance cases, courts have excused warrantless searches of cell phones
without specific evidence that the cell phone in the case would actually delete, or be
subject to remote deletion of, information contained within the phone.226 As a result,
courts have lost touch with the underlying principle of the Fourth Amendment and
the original justifications for what were once referred to as the “few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions” of the Fourth Amendment. 227
The drafters of the Fourth Amendment were undoubtedly motivated by a fear of
a powerful unfettered government, and sought to ensure the protection of individual’s
personal effects beyond the life of the very ink which breathed life into the
Amendment.228 One of the most personal effects an individual can own in today’s
society is the cell phone, with its capacity to store an unbelievable amount of private
information. This raises serious privacy concerns when such personal data is stored
in a digitized format, easily visible to anyone in possession of the cell phone. Thus,
cell phones are decidedly not analogous to address books or even other electronic
devices such as pagers, which the Court has found searchable under the exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause. Cell phones, capable of storing recent
223. See id. at *10.
224. Id. at *11.
225. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No.

1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111623 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2008); United States v.
Meador, No. 1:06 CR 134 CDP DDN, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92728 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 7, 2008).
226. See, e.g., Salgado, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77266; United States v. Zamora, No. 1:05-CR-250-WSD,

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40775 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2005); United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291
(D. Kan. 2003), aff ’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. United States v. McNeill, 136 F. App’x 153 (10th
Cir. 2005).
227. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
228. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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checking account transactions and e-mails of its users, among other things, cannot
be equated with solely call-back-number-storing pagers. To make such a conclusion
is to ignore and virtually nullify the very protections the drafters of the Fourth
Amendment sought to ensure throughout time and to all types of effects, even those
not yet even envisioned at the time of the drafting. A thorough examination of the
early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence raises questions about how a warrantless
search of a modern-day cell phone could fall into any of the exceptions of the Fourth
Amendment.
A thorough and critical analysis of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
demonstrates that cell phones are not closed containers because they are not capable
of storing physical objects, as closed containers were originally defined. Unlike mere
physical objects, cell phones store information in a digital format, allowing for an
incredible amount of personal information to be stored on a very small device.
Therefore, warrantless cell phone searches should not be upheld under the search
incident to arrest or automobile exception. Additionally, the exigent circumstances
exception should only justify a warrantless cell phone search where there are specific
and articulable facts, known to the officer at the time of a warrantless cell phone
search, that the particular phone would delete archived information or be subject to
remote deletion.
The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Smith and the Northern U.S. District Court
for the District Court of California in United States v. Park provide instruction for
how courts can adhere to these principles, and, thus, the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement, in adjudicating warrantless cell phone searches.229
In Smith, the defendant was lawfully arrested at his home for trafficking
cocaine.230 Upon defendant’s arrest, a cell phone found on his person was seized and
later searched, specifically, officers searched the recent calls log and address book. 231
The court found that cell phones are not closed containers because they cannot hold
physical objects within them as required by Belton.232 Further, the court recognized
the unique privacy concerns at stake when an officer conducts a warrantless search of
a cell phone.233 Invoking the rationale of Chadwick, the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
Once the cell phone is in police custody, the state has satisfied its immediate
interest in collecting and preserving evidence and can take preventive steps to
ensure that the data found on the phone are neither lost nor erased. But
because a person has a high expectation of privacy in a cell phone’s contents,
police must then obtain a warrant before intruding into the phone’s contents. 234

229. See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009); United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 40596 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
230. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 950–51.
231. Id. at 950.
232. Id. at 954.
233. Id. at 955.
234. Id.
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Importantly, the court acknowledged that the government was unable to prove that
the cell phone posed a danger to officer safety or that exigent circumstances justified
the search.235
In United States v. Park, the court found that a warrantless search of a defendant’s
cell phone violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches.236 There, the defendants were arrested pursuant to a valid search warrant. 237
Upon their arrest, officers seized cell phones and later searched the cell phones.238
Relying on Chadwick, the district court in Park held that “for the purposes of Fourth
Amendment analysis cellular phones should be considered ‘possessions within an
arrestee’s immediate control’ and not part of ‘the person.’ This is so because modern
cellular phones have the capacity for storing immense amounts of private
information.” 239 The court in Park, like the court in Smith, took notice that the
government did not present specific evidence of exigent circumstances justifying the
search.240
Park and Smith provide a model for courts to use when analyzing warrantless cell
phone searches that will ensure adherence to the principles underlying the Fourth
Amendment. Preliminarily, a court deciding whether a particular warrantless cell
phone search was lawful should engage in only one colloquy241—whether there were
exigent circumstances justifying the search, specifically, whether information on the
cell phone was actually subject to remote deletion at the moment of the search.
Where officers entertained a reasonable belief that the cell phone would be subject to
imminent remote deletion and could not engage in any preventative measures to
ensure that the data on the phone would not be lost, a warrantless search of a cell
phone should be excused by exigent circumstances and found to be constitutional.
Absent this very limited circumstance, however, a court should never uphold the
search of a cell phone absent a warrant.
A. Cell Phones Are Not Closed Containers
Integral to any analysis of a warrantless cell phone search is whether cell phones
are closed containers. In all three aforementioned exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment, the searches of the contents of cell phones were upon a finding that a
cell phone is a closed container. In Belton, the Court defined a closed container as
“any object capable of holding another object. It thus includes . . . luggage, boxes,
235. Id.
236. See United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40596 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
237. Id. at *4.
238. Id. at *4, *12, *13.
239. Id. at *21 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977)).
240. Id. at *24.
241. This is because, as Smith and Park have demonstrated, cell phones are not closed containers and thus not

searchable under the search incident to arrest and automobile exceptions. Therefore, an analysis of those
exceptions is irrelevant.
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bags, clothing, and the like.”242 Objects that have been found to be closed containers
include a cigarette package, a wallet, and an address book.243 The definition assumes
that a closed container must be able to contain a physical, tangible object. Electronic
information, in contrast, is not a physical, tangible object and, therefore, does not fall
within Belton’s definition of a closed container.
Courts erred in applying the closed container definition from the early 1990s to
the pager cases.244 The analyses applied in the pager cases laid the foundation for
courts to later find that electronic devices, like cell phones, are closed containers by
analogy to pagers.245 Other courts tasked with evaluating the legality of warrantless
searches of cell phones merely assumed, without provided any analysis in support,
that cell phones were closed containers.246 Yet other courts asserted that cell phones
are analogous to wallets and address books.247 At least one court acknowledged the
definition of Belton and posited that cell phones are closed containers because they
contain information within.248 In sum, these courts have “fail[ed] to consider the
Supreme Court’s definition of ‘container’ in Belton.”249
B. A Showing of Exigent Circumstances Should Require Proof of an Actual Risk of
Information Loss
The warrantless searches of cell phones should not be justified by the exigent
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment without specific proof that the
cell phone could have actually lost information. In Vale v. Lousiana, the Supreme
Court explicitly held that “the burden rests on the State to show the existence of . . .
an exceptional situation” to excuse a warrantless search on the basis of exigent
242. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981) (“‘Container’ here denotes any object capable of holding

another object. It thus includes closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located
anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.”).
243. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (cigarette package); United States v. Rodriguez, 995

F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993) (address book); United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1989)
(wallet).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Romero-Garcia, 991 F.

Supp. 1223 (D. Or. 1997); United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1993); People v.
Samaniego, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); People v. Bullock, 277 Cal. Rptr. 63 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990); State v. Deluca, 775 A.2d 1284 (N.J. 2001); State v. Harris, 648 S.E.2d 218 (N.C. Ct. App.
2007).
245. See United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2009).
246. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No.

1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111623 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2008); United States v.
Meador, No. 1:06 CR 134 CDP DDN, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92728 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 7, 2008).
247. See, e.g., Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104; United States v. Urbina, No. 06-CR-336, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

96345 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2007); United States v. Cote, No. 03 CR 271, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11725
(N.D. Ill. May 26, 2005), aff ’d, 504 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2007).
248. United States v. Cole, No. 1:09-CR-0412-ODE-RGV, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82822, at *64 (N.D. Ga.

Aug. 11, 2010).
249. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009).
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circumstances. 250 In Vale, the Court held that where there was no evidence that
anyone was in a position to actually destroy the narcotics, the warrantless search
could not be justified under exigent circumstances.251
Likewise, in the case of a warrantless search of a cell phone, unless it can be
demonstrated that the specific phone could delete information or that someone was
in a position to remotely erase the information on the phone, the search should not
be excused on the basis of exigent circumstances. When such definitive
constitutionally protected privacy rights are at stake, it is not sufficient to merely
assert the possibility that the information could be deleted from the cell phone to
justify the warrantless search.252
The analytical framework that this note proposes begins with the presumption
that the particular warrantless cell phone search was unlawful. This presumption
may only be overcome through testimony of the officer who searched the cell phone
without a warrant. The officer’s testimony must contain specific and articulable
facts, known to the officer at the time of the search, demonstrating that the specific
cell phone was at risk of remote deletion of potential evidence. Additionally, the
officer must further testify that there were no preventative measures available to him
at the time of the search which could secure any evidence potentially stored on the
cell phone. This framework will adhere to the principles of the Fourth Amendment
by protecting the significant privacy concerns unique to modern-day cell phones—
concerns that will only increase as society progresses toward further technological
advances.
V. GETTING BACK TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE IMPORTANCE OF
INSTILLING A ROBUST FRAMEWORK FOR THE SEARCH OF CELL PHONES

The courts that have upheld warrantless searches of cell phones have failed to
fully account for the unique privacy concerns inherent in modern-day cell phones.253
There are few items today that are more personal and deserving of robust Fourth
Amendment protection than a cell phone. The ability of modern cell phones “to
store large amounts of private data gives their users a reasonable and justifiable
expectation of a higher level of privacy in the information they contain.”254 This level

250. 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970).
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See, e.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40596, at *21 (N.D. Cal. May

23, 2007) (“[M]odern cellular phones have the capacity for storing immense amounts of private
information. Unlike pagers or address books, modern cell phones record incoming and outgoing calls,
and can also contain address books, calendars, voice and text messages, email, video and pictures.
Individuals can store highly personal information on their cell phones, and can record their most private
thoughts and conversations on their cell phones through email and text, voice and instant messages”
(footnote omitted)).
254. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955.
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of privacy should not be subject to exceptions to the warrant requirement that bear
no relation to the specific search.
The exceptions to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment were not meant
to swallow up the protection against unreasonable searches that the drafters sought
to guarantee.255 However, the application of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement to searches of cell phones have threatened to do just that and
have undermined much of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.
Courts should strictly enforce the warrant requirement for searches of cell phones
to ensure that the Fourth Amendment protection remains intact. Notably, when
applications for a warrant to search cell phones are presented to the courts they can
be denied because a neutral magistrate has decided that there is insufficient cause to
sidestep an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures.256 The one and only exception that should ever be entertained
by a court is the exigent circumstances exception. Second, a court should only excuse
a warrantless search of a cell phone under this exception when the government has
produced evidence to show that, but for the warrantless search, the specific cell
phone would actually have deleted information or would have been subject to remote
deletion of information.
The very high and well-founded expectation of privacy a person has in their cell
phone should not be overridden by anything less than this high standard. The
fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment—that no search shall be
conducted without warrant or probable cause—demands it.
To uphold a warrantless search of a modern-day cell phone is to permit the very
invasion of privacy the drafters of the Fourth Amendment sought to protect against.
Modern-day cell phones have the capacity to store an incredible wealth of private
information, from bank account passwords to a detailed log of an individual’s day-today activities. By strictly enforcing the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment to
searches of cell phones, courts will ensure, through a neutral magistrate, that there
exist valid justifications to invade one of the most private personal effects of
individuals today. Courts will thereby take the first in what will hopefully be many
steps toward getting back to the Fourth Amendment.

255. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
256. See, e.g., In re The Search of Certain Cell Phones, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008).
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